We address the problem of secure r emote access to a site's internal web server from outside the rewall. The goal is to give authorized users access to sensitive information, while protecting the information from others. We implemented our solution using a one-time password scheme for client authentication and SSL for con dentiality. Our main design considerations were s e curity, performance, ease of use, availability, and scale. We were further constrained by the desire t o l e ave our rewall and local infrastructure unchanged.
Introduction
Most large organizations today h a ve to resort to using rewalls to protect themselves from would-be hostile attackers on the Internet. While rewalls are an inconvenience, when well administered, they do a reasonable job of isolating an organization from the rest of the world. The security policy usually amounts to total trust of all insiders and total mistrust of outsiders, where the rewall de nes the boundary 2 .
As a result of classifying users as insiders or outsiders, companies can have di erent i n ternal and external web views. People inside the rewall have access to the internal site, which contains sensitive data such as company strategy, business plans, etc. In addition, they can update personal information such a s the payroll data and bene t allocations. The latter is often protected by simple passwords on top of SSL connections 5 .
The external view of a web site is usually commercial and geared towards customers. Companies often use their external web site to display product information, details for investors, and other marketing material. More sophisticated organizations use their external web site for customer transactions, billing, and customer service.
It is common practice for the same fully quali ed domain name to refer to the internal site when a user access the web from the inside, and to the external site when an external user makes a request. For example, here at AT&T, www.research.att.com is an alias to akalice.research.att.com, a w eb server behind the rewall, and www.research.att.com is an alias for akpublic.research.att.com for users outside the rewall. Employees can even have t wo v ersions of their home page, both referenced by http: www.research.att.com info username.
The web page on akalice may contain proprietary information, whereas the copy o n akpublic should not.
A problem arises when insiders travel outside of the rewall boundary. Most sites allow users telnet and ftp access to their machines from the outside so that they can read e-mail and edit les. Usually, the users are authenticated through some strong one-time password mechanism in hardware or software 8 . While users have a legitimate right t o a ccess the internal web server, it is not accessible to them. The best they can do is telnet to an internal machine and run a text-based browser, such as lynx http: www.slcc.edu lynx . While textbased browsers can be quite useful, they have severe drawbacks. There is no support for multimedia, executable content, helper applications and other recent features of browsers. Even worse, since telnet connections are usually unencrypted, the web content travels to the remote site in the clear. 1 Finally, public Internet kiosks e.g. at the airport may contain access to HTML browsers but no access to telnet or other Internet services.
Abadi et. al. present a solution that uses a web tunnel on the rewall for access from outside the rewall 1 . Their solution requires changes to the rewall and the use of client-side Javascript in the browser. Our goal is to allow access without any modi cation to the internal infrastucture, and in particular with-out changing the rewall or the end web server. We achieve this without requiring Javascript.
We l a yer a strong client authentication mechanism on top of SSL to allow legitimate users access to an internal web site from outside of the rewall. The idea is to make the session as transparent as possible for the user without compromising the security of the information. We do this without any c hanges to our rewall or internal infrastructure. The system allows users to access the internal web from outside the rewall. This is useful for employees who are on the road, or who receive their home access from a third party Internet Service Provider ISP.
Client authentication
Strong client authentication schemes exist for applications such a s telnet and ftp. Most notable are challenge response hardware tokens and one-time password schemes based on hash chaining 8, 9 or pseudorandom functions 17 .
Client authentication for the web exists in the form of client certi cates issued by organizations such a s Verisign and Thawte. However, the identity v eri cation mechanisms of these organizations are often inadequate 18 and thus, these mechanisms are not in widespread use. We implemented our scheme using hash chaining 11 see Section 5.1.
Our environment
Following standard practice, our rewall policy allows hosts behind the rewall to establish TCP connections to hosts outside the rewall on any port, while inbound connections are tightly restricted. Thus any mechanism that gives access to users on the outside must involve either opening an inbound port on the rewall or initiating a connection from the inside. Our intent i s t o l a yer our solution on top of an existing infrastructure, so we opt for the latter.
Another feature of our rewall is that it tears down inactive connections every 15 minutes. We initiate our service from behind the rewall, so we h a ve t o m a k e sure that there is alway s a w ay for external clients to contact the internal web server when despite the fact that idle connections are torn down by the rewall.
We assume that users require occasional access from untrusted sites such a s I n ternet cafes or terminal rooms at conferences. Our only requirement i s that the web client be SSL enabled. We build user authentication into our protocol. We refer to the web client as a Dumb W eb Terminal DWT. We strive to treat the DWT as untrusted" to the extent possible; nonetheless, the administrator of the DWT has complete control of all data coming in and out of the machine. So, in our model, we m ust assume that any internal web content viewed on a DWT could be secretly recorded and copied by the site administrator. What we do not allow, however, is for the administrator to be able to access other sensitive content b y virtue of observing something.
It is possible that Virtual Private Network VPN technology could be used to allow access to the internal web, but we h a ve not adopted any of these products at our site. Furthermore, we believe that many institutions would prefer to use a lightweight, free solution such as ours, rather than to invest in VPN products just for internal web access.
Architecture
Our architecture is diagramed in Figure 1 . The main component of our system is the proxy. Of necessity, there is one subcomponent inside the rewall and one on the outside. A user on a DWT connects to the proxy through the Internet with an authentication request, using a special URL that contains his her username. Next, the proxy contacts the authentication server to verify that the request is from a v alid user. Once authentication completes, requests from the user are forwarded to the internal web server, which responds as usual. No modi cation is required to the DWT, the rewall or the internal web server. Figure 2 shows the proxy in more detail. The internal machine, which w e call pushweb, maintains a control connection to the external machine called absent. This is necessary because our rewall does not allow connections from absent to pushweb. Users a t a D WT request a connection to absent by t yping in a URL with absent.research.att.com as the hostname. When absent receives a connection from the browser, it records some information about the connection and sends a request along the control connection. Pushweb then opens a data connection to absent. Absent uses the data connection to forward requests to pushweb, which forwards them to the web server. The web server processes the request and returns an HTTP reply to pushweb. The reply is forwarded to absent, which sends it back to the DWT, where it is displayed for the user.
Web pages received from the web server may contain links to other pages behind the rewall. If the links are not changed, then future requests will not When the user clicks on Business plan", the DWT attempts to connect directly to the machine myhost, and, of course, the rewall does not allow this. To solve this, pushweb does some processing on web pages before sending them to absent. First, all relative URLs are translated to absolute URLs with host names and directories. URLs that are outside of the trusted domain are not changed further. However, URLs that are behind the rewall are prepended with some security information see Section 5. cmd=user cmd" can be login, geturl, logout, or OTP resp and indicates the action to be taken by pushweb with the request. user" contains the name of the user. This is his her login account ID.
hex data This is explained in Section 5.4. original-url This is the original URL that was contained in the page, converted to an absolute URL if necessary. Recall that one of our goals is to make the browsing experience the same as when users are behind the rewall. Rewriting URLs achieves this. Pages appear the same to users, but when links are clicked on, the pages are requested through absent. The only di erences users might notice are the appearances of codi ed URLs in the message window of the browser when the mouse passes over links, and the URL that is displayed in the location window.
In our system, absent forwards all requests to pushweb. Pushweb in turn, removes the substring https: absent.research.att.com and processes the remainder of the request based on the values of cmd and user.
Authentication and security
Security is paramount when we consider exporting private and con dential information outside of the rewall. We m ust assure that only valid users can access the internal web, while active attackers on the Internet cannot. In this section, we describe our techniques for authenticating clients and maintaining the privacy of the information from illegitimate outsiders.
Hash chaining
The original idea for hash chaining is due to Lamport 11 . There are two phases to authentication using hash chaining. In the initialization phase, a user picks a strong password, pw a n d a n umber, n, and using a well-known cryptographically strong oneway hash function, f, computes y = f n pw. This amounts to n applications of f to the password. The value y is stored on an authentication server.
In the authentication phase, the user sends y The security of the system lies in the fact that an eavesdropper on the network cannot compute any onetime passwords from previously used passwords. The use of a cryptographically strong hash function for f ensures that.
There is an Internet RFC 7 that describes a standard one-time password scheme that uses hash chains for authentication. The S KEY and OPIE one-time password systems are freely available, widely used implementations of this standard.
User authentication
We use OPIE for authentication. To use Absent, users must have a n e n try in the OPIE keys database. To do this, they run the absent init program which is a subset of the functionality o f opie init. The users specify the number of one-time passwords, n and a secret passphrase, pw. MD5 16 is used as the one-way hash function, f. The program runs setuid to the database administrator and writes n; f n pw into the OPIE database, along with some other information about the users. At this point, users are initialized to use Absent.
An initialized user can use any dumb w eb terminal DWT, authenticate, and access the internal web. The rst thing a user does is issue a login request by typing in a special URL.
https: absent.research.att.com login=user The mechanics of the communication between absent and pushweb are discussed in Section 6. For the purposes of this section, we assume a data connection between absent and pushweb exists. absent forwards the request to pushweb, which immediately negotiates an SSL connection with the DWT see next section, while absent blindly forwards data packets between them. 2 At this point, absent acts as a wire.
Once the SSL connection is established, pushweb looks up the user in the OPIE database. If the user is registered, pushweb submits a request to the authentication server which generates an OPIE challenge. Pushweb then constructs an HTML page with a form for the user to enter the OPIE response and sends the page over the SSL connection to the DWT. An OPIE challenge is of the form otp-md5 386 bu5414 ext where otp-md5 indicates that MD5 is the hash function, 386 is the number of times to iterate the function, and bu5414 is the seed for the generator. Figure 3 shows the OPIE challenge page. The user enters the response into the form and clicks the submit button. A list of one-time passwords can be printed on paper in advance or computed using a calculator. To compute a response, the user enters the seed, the number of times to iterate and the secret passphrase into an OPIE calculator. One of the reasons we c hose OPIE is that calculators are becoming widespread. We use a public domain application on our Palm Pilot http: www.linet.it pilot a pilototp.zip to authenticate.
After the user submits the one-time password, it passes over the SSL connection to pushweb, which sends the response to the authentication server. If the authentication succeeds, then an entry is created in a user table, and the page requested in the challenge form is returned to the user. One of the elds in the user table entry is an expiration time. In our system an authentication is valid for 20 minutes. After that, the user is presented with another challenge page.
It is important that the one-time password challenge and response occur over an established SSL connection. One-time password systems such as OPIE and S KEY have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks 17 . The con dentiality and replay prevention properties of SSL ensure that a play-in-themiddle attack e.g. where the response from the user is blocked and then later used by the intruder is not possible.
Connection con dentiality
Packets between the DWT and the rewall are vulnerable to sni ng attacks. Therefore, we m ust establish a private channel between pushweb and the DWT. While this channel passes through the absent proxy, the proxy is not privy to the data passed along it; it simply forwards packets along the channel. To accomplish this, we use HTTP over SSL, as implemented in the Apache-SSL web server. We further restrict the set of ciphers supported on the server to those providing U.S. domestic-quality" encryption, as shown in Table 1 .
It is important that users check the security information about their SSL connection to ensure that they are communicating with pushweb. Otherwise, an imposter could substitute some other valid server certi cate and elicit OPIE passwords from the user, or feed him her bogus content. Most browsers are con gured to warn the user if the name in a certicate does not match the site requested. Thus, the certi cate for pushweb actually contains the name absent.research.att.com.
At present w e do not support internal SSL servers. If an internal server uses SSL, then we h a ve t o l a yer our secure connection over that SSL connection. This is presents some problems see Section 8.
Other security features 5.4.1 Authenticated URLs
One of the important security features of our system is that no adversary should be able to access the internal web server. To that end, we bind every URL to an authenticated user. When a user authenticates using the one-time password scheme, an entry is created in a user The eld immediately preceding the original-url contains some security information. The rst two c haracters, in this case 2b, correspond to the hexidecimal representation of the length in bytes of the original-url see Section 5.4.2. The remaining data, 5db86c1f6e, represent the output of a Message Authentication Code MAC function, truncated to the 40 most signi cant bits. To compute the MAC, the server uses the key in the user table and the original URL. Truncating a MAC makes it more di cult for an attacker to exhaustively search for the key because there are many possible keys that could produce the shortened output 13, 1 5 . In choosing 40 bits, we trade o the amount o f w ork it requires for an attacker to exhaustively generate a valid MAC v ersus the length of the URLs. Most systems limit URL length to 256 bytes, so we w anted to add as little as possible to this. To generate a valid URL with a valid MAC, an attacker would have to test on the order of 2 40 URLs with random MACs. The birthday attack 13 that would require 2 20 trials does not work here because the sample space for URLs is limited to valid URLs on the server. Since every trial requires a request from the server and keys expire every 20 minutes, it is infeasible for an attacker to generate a valid URL. In addition, we log unsuccessful requests, and an exhaustive search is immediately obvious on the server.
When the pushweb server receives a URL, it rst checks that the user is valid i.e. registered with Absent. It then checks that the length of the URL is correct. Finally, it retrieves the key from the user table, computes the MAC, and compares the most signi cant 40 bits to the MAC. If all of these tests are correct then the page is retrieved. If the key has expired, the server sends a new one-time password authentication form. This results in a new MACing key for the user after successful authentication. Thus, old URLs with MACs from expired keys, are useless.
CGI scripts
When a user submits information to the server in a form using a GET method, a URL containing the names and values of the input boxes is passed from the DWT to the server. This URL cannot be MACed in advance by pushweb because there is no way to know what values the user will enter. For example, say that a CGI script is referenced by the following URL where absent represents absent.research.att.com https: absent geturl=alice 32a5d386cf6e http: www.research.att.com ~alice cgi-bin reg.cgi
The URL sent to the server when the user submits could be https: absent geturl=alice 32a5d386cf6e http: www.research.att.com ~alice cgi-bin reg.cgi&name=bob
The MAC is correct for the rst 50 bytes of the original URL, but it does not include &name=bob". Therefore, we include the length, in hex, of the original URL that references the CGI script. In the above example the length is 50, which is hex 32.
The most signi cant 40 bits of the actual MAC are 0xa5d386cf6e.
The e ect is that authenticated users can execute CGI scripts as long as their keys are valid. A CGI script that is MACed by an expired key cannot be invoked. A potential danger is that an attacker who can surmise that a particular request is a CGI form can replay the message to cause the script to execute again with the same input data as before. Fortunately, SSL protects against replay attacks, so our system is not vulnerable to this.
Generating random keys
The security o f a n y system that uses cryptographic operations lies in the unpredictability of the keys. As described above, our system requires that the server generate a secret key corresponding to each user to compute the MACs of URLs. We employ an expensive function to generate as random a seed as possible, followed by a speedy operation to generate user keys from the initial randomness.
Our system employs the randlib package from cryptolib 10 as a true" random number generator. This package collects as much information as possible from the host environment and mixes it using cryptographic functions. The software uses information about network connections, the process table, memory, disk, etc. The process is very tedious and slow. Therefore, we call the truerand function only upon server startup to generate a master key. Then, we use DES 14 as a pseudorandom function with the master secret as the key, to generate all other MAC k eys.
It is important to note that the recent results showing 56 bit DES to be vulnerable to exhaustive search 6 do not in any w ay impact the appropriateness of DES as a pseudo random number generator PRNG. When DES is used as a PRNG, there are no plaintext ciphertext pairs for an attacker to use, and thus, a DES cracking machine cannot be used to predict the output of the generator. This is true because the MAC k eys that we generate the output of DES and the initial random seed obtained from randlib are never available to the attacker.
After generating the master secret, a counter is initialized. Then, every time a new key is needed, we compute new-key = DESmaster-key; counter and then increment the counter. This has the advantage that computing new keys is fast, while cracking these keys without knowledge of the master key is di cult.
To illustrate this, we describe how the attacker might crack the master-key from which the user keys are derived. First, the attacker must collect URLs containing MACs from one user. These are limited in numberby the lifetime of the key 20 minutes and the number of links in the requests made by the user. In addition, the URLs are generally unavailable to outsides in our system because SSL is used. Next, the attacker must compute the user's key. This amounts to breaking HMAC, a task considered to be infeasible. Even if the attacker nds a key that computes all of the MACs correctly, there is no guarantee that it is the right k ey because the truncation of the MACs to 40 bits results in many possible keys see Section 5.4.1. Finally, the attacker knows that user keys are produced by applying DES to a counter, so a reasonable guess can be made about the input value. Thus, after doing all of this work, the attacker can produce a pair fP;Cg where P is a range of possible plaintext some counter value and C is a possible ciphertext a user's MAC k ey. To obtain more pairs, the attacker must break HMAC for another user. The best known techniques for breaking DES involve 2 43 plaintext ciphertext pairs 13 . As stated above, brute force in not an option because even the ciphertexts are not known to the attacker. We conclude that it is not feasible for an attacker to crack the master key. F or additional security, w e note that the master key does not represent a n y state in the system; it is only used to seed a PRNG. So, it can be changed at any time by calling truerand again.
Other issues
For maximum security, it is important that users clear the memory and disk cache and then kill their browser. In addition, we include the HTTP directive Cache-Control: no-cache in every page. This has the e ect of forcing the browser not to cache pages. The method is not fool-proof, as users could still save the page they are viewing onto the remote machine, but there is a limit to how m uch w e can protect the information from users who are determined to expose it.
6 Implementation Wherever possible, we used existing software to implement Absent. This both simpli es security analysis if we can assume the component parts to be secure and reduces our coding e ort particularly in the case of the internal proxy and one-time password systems. For this reason, only the Absent daemon itself consists entirely of original code; most of the other components make use of exiting code.
The Absent system consists of two daemons that implement the functions of the external server absentd and internal proxy pushweb, and the protocol with which these daemons communicate over a control channel. The control channel is opened by pushweb at startup. The protocol on this channel is fairly simple, consisting of ve messages:
HELOtimestamp; mac: Sent b y pushweb when opening the control channel. absentd checks that the timestamp is within a reasonable amount of time from the current time to prevent replay attacks and ensures that the supplied MAC is in fact HMAC-MD5secret, timestamp, where secret is a MACing secret constructed at installation time and shared by the two daemons. If the MAC matches and the source of the connection is the con gured address of pushweb, the connection is assumed by absentd to be valid. If not, the connection attempt is rejected.
COPENid, timestamp, client sockaddr, MAC:
When a client connects to absentd, this message is sent t o pushweb to indicate that a new data connection for the client should be opened. This connection will be used for proxied data between the client and pushweb. The client sockaddr is a Berkeley-style socket address, indicating the site from which the client is connecting. The id argument is used by absentd to identify the client; it has no meaning to pushweb, and is essentially an opaque value which should simply be returned. The timestamp and MA C elds are checked by pushweb as in the HELOmessage, with the exception that the MAC c o vers all the arguments to the control message. COPEN Rid; timestamp; MAC : The COPENR message is not, strictly speaking, control channel protocol. It is sent along a new data data channel by pushweb after the connection is opened. On receipt of the message, absentd does the usual checks on timestamp and MA Cand, if the id value refers to a waiting connection, begins acting as a proxy for the client. P I N G timestamp; MAC, P O N G timestamp; MAC: Our rewall times out inactive connections after a period of time. To prevent this, Absent implements a simple keepalive protocol. These messages implement that protocol. Periodically, either side may send a P I N Gmessage. The sending side expects to receive a P O N Gmessage within a reasonable period of time. If none is received, the control connection is assumed to be dead; if absentd notices this, it stops accepting new client connections until a new control connection is established existing connections continue to be serviced. If pushweb notices this, it attempts to reestablish the control connection. Note that all control messages have associated MACs over their arguments. Both daemons are fairly draconian about dealing with incorrect MAC v alues. If an incorrect MAC is received, the control connection is immediately closed. This suggests a fairly simple denial-of-service attack based on the injection of bogus packets. No attempt has been made at this point to repair this problem, and the authors welcome suggestions.
absentd is a simple roughly 900 lines, standalone C program. Aside from implementation of the protocol described above, it is an unremarkable blind proxy.
The internal daemon, pushweb, is more complex. The daemon consists of three parts:
A modi ed Apache web server The URL-rewriting handler The one-time password interface The choice of Apache as the base upon which t o build pushweb was driven primarily by the fact that Apache itself provides most of the features pushweb requires:
An SSL implementation with Apache SSL A proxy A w eb server Available source.
Modi cations to Apache
The modi cations to the Apache source are minimal; they consist mainly of replacing Apache's connection-accepting code with code that on receipt of a COPEN message on the control channel, creates a new connection to the absent daemon. Once the socket address of this new connection is set to the client sockaddr value supplied with the COPEN message, the connection appears to apache to be a normal client connection from the client address. This spoo ng allows Apache's access control and logging functions to behave normally, and permits us to use the remainder of the Apache code unmodi ed. The changes to Apache source entail fewer than 100 lines of C.
URL-rewriting handler
We've writen an apache handler to deal with all tasks that are preformed once the connection is established. These include handling requests, authenticating users, fetching web documents, rewriting URLs in HTML documents, and returning the document t o the client through absent. Apache allows third parties to write handlers to t into certain phases of each transaction. We've written our handler in perl to utilize its powerful regular expression functionality and to avoid recompiling every time the code changes. The changes require only a minor addition to the Apache startup con guration les. This handler, which involves fewer than 500 lines of code, is invoked during the URL translation phase.
The rst step is to determine whether the command value is login, OTP response, logout, o r geturl. For a login request, the code ensures that the user is registered and sends the OTP challenge to the client. When an OTP response command is received, we c heck the validity of the response. If valid, the user is logged in, and the requested page included as part of the OTP response is returned to the client with all of the URLs on the page that reference our internal domain rewritten. Upon a logout request, the MAC of the logout URL is checked and, if valid, the user is logged out. The log out consists of removing their entry in the table on pushweb, in particular, deleting their MAC k ey. Otherwise, we assume that it is a forgery and return an error.
When a geturl command is received, our handler checks the MAC of the requested URL and, if valid, submits the request to the internal web server. If the Content-type of the response from the server is "text html", the document is then parsed to identify all links on the page. Every link containing a relative URL is converted to one containing an absolute URL by adding the http: " protocol, the complete server name such a s m usic.research.att.com, and the proper path information e.g. replacing .. foo.html with dir foo.html to the URL if they are missing. A second pass is then made through the document to prepend the Absent information to each URL. Finally, a logout button is added to the page, and the Content-length header is adjusted to match the new larger document length. If the Content-type is not "text html", the response from the server remains unedited. Finally, the HTTP response is returned to the client.
Performance
The most signi cant performance bottleneck in Absent is the parsing engine. Therefore, we built a special-purpose parser that leaves most HTML untouched, and is concerned only with tags that can contain URLs. In addition to the overhead of parsing, a MAC is computed for each link, resulting in 2 computations of MD5. As URL length is limited to 256 bytes, the hash function only iterates once for each call. Thus, a page containing 750 links requires 1500 iterations of MD5. However, we nd that this is only signi cant i.e. perceptible for pages with a tremendous number of links. Most pages are processed very quickly with an unnoticeable overhead.
As an extreme example, we examined a page with 3398 links. The size of the original HTML le is 116,997 bytes. This page takes 18 seconds to parse and convert all the URLs, including changing relative URLs to absolue, parsing, and computing MACs on our pushweb, a Sparc Ultra 2. The same operation took almost a minute using an o the shelf parser. The resulting page is 363,497 bytes long, a 311 increase in size. Thus, performance is strongly tied to the number of links on a page. It is our experience that most pages contain few enough links that the added latency is not noticeable.
Security assessment
The security of our system rests on the security of the underlying mechanisms and their composition. We use o -the-shelf software components such as OPIE, SSLEAY, and HMAC. These packages have been heavily scrutinized by experts in the security eld, so we h a ve some con dence in them. We constantly monitor bug reports on relevant newsgroups and mailing lists, and plan to upgrade immediately any component that is discovered to have a security problem when a patch is released.
Compromise of absent
We constantly and carefully monitor absent. H o wever, this machine is outside of the rewall, and it is reasonable to assume that it will come under attack. Assuming that a sophisticated attacker manages to become root on absent without our noticing, we examine the possible consequences. The attacker's goals are the following:
Denial of service The attacker prevents valid users from being able to use the system. Passively eavesdrop on a user's session The attacker attempts to see the contents of the user's interaction with the internal web server without diverting from the SSL protocol.
Serve bogus information to a user In this attack, the attacker masquerades as the internal web server and serves up ctitious information to the user.
Obtain valid one-time passwords In this scenario, the attacker's goal is to fool the user into exposing a one-time password with a lower number than any previously used.
Access the internal web The attacker attempts to use its control over absent to bypass the authentication mechanism and access protected content on the internal web server.
Obtain root on pushweb The attacker attempts to use its control over absent to attack pushweb.
Compromise of internal network The attacker attempts to use its control over absent to compromise the internal network including control over machines, and les. The rst attack, denial of service, is not preventable as an attacker who controls absent can easily close all sockets on the machine and refuse to communicate with anyone. We monitor the machine for this condition and can detect such denial of service attacks. The second attack is more di cult for the attacker. Absent serves only as an SSL proxy. It blindly forwards SSL data between pushweb and the client. There are no encryption decryption keys stored on absent. Therefore, there is no way that the attacker can eavesdrop on a session without breaking SSL or performing a more active attack.
To serve bogus information to the user, the attacker must establish an SSL connection with the browser. To do this, it must serve a v alid certi cate. Such certi cates are not too di cult to obtain. If such a n attack is successful, the server could fool the user into revealing secret one-time passwords. The only way to prevent this attack is to require users to check the security information in the certi cate when they use the system, and to verify that the name of the server in the certi cate is absent". 3 3 Even though the SSL connection is between the DWT and pushweb, the client certi cate we serve has the name absent in it. This is because the DWT connects to an address that starts https: absent.research.att.com s o w e use the name absent i n the certi cate so that the browser won't complainthat the name of the server and the name in the certi cate don't match. The Without compromising pushweb, the internal server, SSL, or one-time passwords, there is no way t o use access to absent to get to the internal web server. This is because the only messages coming from absent to pushweb are control messages instructing pushweb to open data connections. These connections are used to forward SSL tra c. An attacker on absent can exhaust resources on pushweb, but that is the extent o f the damage possible. Similarly, barring bu er overow attacks and other such vulnerabilities related to bugs in the software, there is no way to use root access on absent to break into pushweb or the internal network more easily than from an arbitrary host on the Internet.
Compromise of pushweb
Because pushweb runs behind the rewall, a root compromise could be devastating. Besides compromising all access control on web content, an attacker could launch attacks on the internal le system and on user accounts. To compromise this machine, an attacker needs to exploit vulnerabilities in the pushweb code or existing weaknesses in the rewall. The latter is a problem independent of our service, and we assume that others are protecting the perimeter. We were very careful about memory allocation to avoid bu er over ow problems the leading cause of software security a ws 4 .
We take the following special precautions on pushweb.
The pushweb server runs as user nobody, which has permissions only to read and write les needed for the Absent service. No other services are available from pushweb. There are no regular user accounts on pushweb, just administrative accounts to manage the Absent service. All important actions and especially error conditions are logged, and the logs are monitored closely. W e hope eventually to log on a WORM write once-read many disk. All machines except the internal web server are con gured to refuse connections from pushweb. These precautions make it more di cult for an attack o n pushweb to lead to further compromise of the internal network. The logs are crucial to penetration private key corresponding to the public key in the certi cate is kept only on pushweb. detection and recovery. T o date, there have been no successful compromises of pushweb or absent to our knowledge.
Limitations
One fundamental problem in our system is the inability to access secure servers behind the rewall. The reason is that the SSL protocol establishes a secure connection between the server and the end client. If an external user contacts an internal server through absent, there are two possibilities. The rst is that the user's remote machine and the secure server establish an SSL connection directly. The second option is that the client and absent establish an SSL connection, and absent establishes a secure connection to the server and acts as a forwarding agent. Each o f these approaches is problematic.
In the rst scenario, there is no way to rewrite the URLs to point back t o absent so any attempt to access a link on a page from a secure server is blocked by the rewall. Thus, it must be possible to see the contents of pages served to the client the second scenario. However, as the administrators of absent, w e do not want the responsibility of being able to observe tra c that is supposed to be con dential. For example, if a user accesses his her private payroll data, and a dispute later arises about a web transaction, it would be possible to blame us, since we had access to the data. For this and other, similar reasons, we d o not support access to secure servers behind the rewall.
Another limitation of Absent is that some functionality is lost when URLs are dynamically generated on the client side by a scripting language such a s Javascript. There is no way to parse the HTML and nd these URLs. If the URLs reference something behind the rewall, the subsequent request will fail. There is nothing that can be done about this without analyzing the scripting code, and this is known to be very hard to do. It's actually impossible for generalpurpose code 3 .
As mentioned in Section 3, we do not have VPN technology available to us. It is clear that an integrated virtual private network is a better solution than the one we h a ve provided. First, it is more transparent to the users, and second, it is more secure. This is because our system is composed of several di erent components, SSL, Apache, OPIE, and our own code. While the security of one-time passwords is believed to be well understood, and SSL has been analyzed carefully, little or no analysis of the composition of these systems has been done. In fact protocol composition is a very hard problem and has led to security problems in the past 12 . Given our goal of providing internal web access from sites such as terminal rooms at conferences and Internet cafes, it seems that a VPN solution is not feasible.
Conclusions
We present Absent, a system for providing secure access to an internal web server from outside of the rewall. We make use of the secure socket layer SSL protocol to achieve con dentiality and one-time passwords for user authentication. Absent i s designed to minimize change to our local infrastructure and to make use of o -the-shelf security components. The key design considerations were security, performance, ease of use, availability and scale. Our system is currently in production use by researchers at AT&T. The code is freely available at http: www.research.att.com projects absent.
